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Abstract. In this paper a social agent model for joint decision making is 
presented addressing the role of mutually acknowledged empathic 
understanding in the decision making. The model is based on principles from 
recent neurological theories on mirror neurons, internal simulation, and 
emotion-related valuing. Emotion-related valuing of decision options and 
mutual contagion of intentions and emotions between agents are used as a basis 
for mutual empathic understanding and convergence of decisions and their 
associated emotions.  
1   Introduction 
An important aspect in group functioning is the ability for joint decision making. In 
recent years developments in neuroscience have clarified some of the mechanisms 
underlying such processes (e.g., [7, 13, 18]). Two interrelated core concepts in this 
discipline are mirror neurons and internal simulation. Mirror neurons are neurons that 
not only have the function to prepare for a certain action or body change, but are also 
activated upon observing somebody else who is performing or tending to perform this 
action or body change (e.g., [23, 32, 35, 39]). Internal simulation is mental processing 
that copies processes that may take place externally, for example, in another 
individual (e.g., [8, 10, 16, 17, 20]). On the one hand, mirror neurons and internal 
simulation have been put forward as a basic mechanism for imitation and contagion of 
actions and emotions; on the other hand, they have been related to empathy; e.g., [23]. 
In this way mirror neurons and internal simulation provide a basis both to mutually 
tune individual intentions and emotions and to develop mutual empathic 
understanding between persons (e.g., [16, 17, 33, 36]). Usually these two aspects are 
addressed separately, but in joint decision making processes they both play their roles 
in order to achieve solidly grounded joint decisions. 
Empathic understanding can concern both cognitive (e.g., knowing or believing) 
and affective (e.g., feeling) aspects. Affective and cognitive understanding are often 
related to each other, as any cognitive state triggers an associated emotional response 
which is the basis of the related feeling (e.g., [8, 10, 11, 12]). Usually in an individual 
decision making process, before a decision option is chosen an internal simulation 
takes place to predict the expected effects of the option (e.g., [2, 8, 10, 11, 12, 28]). 
Based on these predicted effects a valuation of the option takes place, which may 
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involve or even be mainly based on the affective state associated to this effect (e.g., 
[1, 8, 9, 11, 29, 31]). To achieve a solid joint decision, a shared feeling and valuation 
for the chosen option are important, and also mutual recognition of this sharedness. 
When this is achieved, a common decision has a strong shared emotional grounding 
as the group members do not only intend to follow that option, but they also share a 
good feeling about it, and they have (mutually acknowledged) empathic 
understanding of how other persons feel about the options. The latter may be 
important as well for acceptance of non-joint decisions.   
The obtained social agent model can be used as a basis for the design of human-like 
virtual agents for simulation-based training or in gaming, or for virtual stories. For the 
first type of application the idea is to develop a number of virtual agents cooperating 
with a human trainee as a team in an decision making task. For the second type of 
application the idea is to design a system for agent-based virtual stories in which, for 
example, persons play a role which can be based on the presented model. 
In this paper, first in Section 2 some core concepts used are briefly reviewed. Next, 
in Section 3 the social agent model is presented. In Section 4 some of the explored 
simulation scenarios are discussed. Finally, Section 5 is a discussion. 
2   Mirroring, Internal Simulation and Emotion-Related Valuing  
Two concepts used here as a basis are mirror neurons and internal simulation; in 
combination they provide an individual’s mental function of mirroring mental 
processes of another individual (see also [39]). Mirror neurons are not only firing 
when a subject is preparing an action, but also when somebody else is performing or 
preparing this action and the subject just observes that. They have first been found in 
monkeys (cf. [15, 34]), and after that it has been assumed that similar types of 
neurons also occur in humans, with empirical support, for example, in [25] based on 
fMRI, and [14, 30] based on single cell experiments with epilepsy patients (see also 
[23, 24, 27]). The effect of activation of mirror neurons is context-dependent. A 
specific type of neurons has been suggested to be able to indicate such a context. 
They are assumed to indicate self-other distinction and exert control by allowing or 
suppressing action execution; e.g., [6, 19, 24], and [23], pp. 196-203.  
Activation states of mirror neurons play an important role in mirroring mental 
processes of other persons by internal simulation. In [26] the following causal chain 
for generation of felt emotions is suggested (see also [12], pp. 114-116): 
 
sensory representation  → preparation for bodily changes  → expressed bodily changes  →   
emotion felt =  based on sensory representation of (sensed) bodily changes 
 
As a further step as-if body loops were introduced bypassing actually expressed 
bodily changes (cf. [8], pp. 155-158; see also [10], pp. 79-80; [11, 12]):  
 
sensory representation  →  preparation for bodily changes = emotional response  →   
emotion felt =  based on sensory representation of (simulated) bodily changes 
 
An as-if body loop describes an internal simulation of the bodily processes, without 
actually affecting the body, comparable to simulation in order to perform, for 
example, prediction, mindreading or imagination; e.g., [2], [16], [17], [20], [28]. The 
feelings generated in this way play an important role in valuing predicted or imagined 
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effects of actions, in relation to amygdala activations; see, e.g., [29], [31]. The 
emotional response and feeling mutually affect each other in a bidirectional manner: 
an as-if body loop usually has a cyclic form (see, for example, [11], pp. 91-92; [12], 
pp. 119-122): 
 
emotion felt  =  based on sensory representation of (simulated) bodily changes  →   
preparation for bodily changes = emotional response      
 
As mirror neurons make that some specific sensory input (an observed action of 
another person) directly links to related preparation states, they combine well with as-
if body loops; see also [39], or [12], pp. 102-104. In this way states of other persons 
lead to activation of some of a person’s corresponding own states that at the same 
time play a role in the person’s own feelings and decisions for actions. This provides 
an effective mechanism for how observed actions and feelings and own actions and 
feelings are tuned to each other. Thus a mechanism is obtained which explains how in 
a social context persons fundamentally affect each other’s individual decisions and 
states, including feelings. Moreover, it is also the basis for empathic understanding of 
other persons’ preferences and feelings. Both the tuning and convergence of action 
tendencies and the mutual empathic understanding (even when finally no common 
option is decided for) play a crucial role in joint decision making processes. 
3  The Social Agent Model  
The issues and perspectives briefly reviewed in the introduction and Section 2 have 
been used as a basis for the neurologically inspired cognitive agent model presented 
below (for an overview, see Fig. 1); in summary: 
 
• Decision making is based on emotion-related valuing of the predicted effects of each 
action option  
• Both the tendency to go for an action and the associated emotion are transferred 
between agents via mirroring processes using internal simulation 
• These mirroring processes at the same time induce a gradual process of mutually tuning 
the considered actions and their emotion-related valuations, and the development of 
mutual empathic understanding 
• The outcome of such a joint decision process in principle involves three elements:  
o a common action option 
o a shared positive feeling and valuation for the effect of this action option  
o mutually acknowledged empathic understanding for both the action and feeling  
• In case of an outcome without a common choice for an action option, the process 
results in mutually acknowledged empathic understanding 
• The mutually acknowledged empathic understanding is based on the following criteria: 
(a) Showing the same state as the other agent (nonverbal part of the empathic response) 
(b) Telling that the other agent has this state (verbal part of the empathic response) 
Assuming true, faithful nonverbal and verbal expression, these criteria are in line 
with the criteria of empathy for affective states formulated in [36]. 
 
In the model s denotes a stimulus, a an option for an action to be decided about, and e a 
world state which is an effect of the action. The effect state e is valued by associating a 
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feeling state b to it, which is considered to be positive for the agent (e.g., in accordance 
















Fig. 1. Overview of the social agent model 
The social agent model uses ownership states for actions a and their effects e, both 
for self and other agents, specified by OS(B, s, a, e) with B another agent or self, 
respectively (see Fig. 1). Similarly, ownership states are used for emotions indicated by 
body state b, both for self and other agents, specified by OS(B, e, b) with B another agent 
or self. As an example, the four arrows to OS(B, s, a, e) in Fig. 1 show that an ownership 
state OS(B, s, a, e) is affected by the preparation state PS(a) for the action a, the sensory 
representation SR(b) of the emotion-related value b for the predicted effect e, the sensory 
representation SR(s) of the stimulus s, and the sensory representation SR(B) of the agent B. 
Note that s, a, e, b, and B are parameters for stimuli, actions, effects, body states, and 
agents. In a given agent model multiple instances of each of them can occur. 
Table 1. State properties used 
notation description 
WS(W) world state W: for an action a of agent B, a feeling b of agent B, a stimulus s, effect e, or 
an emotion indicated by body state b 
SS(W) sensor state for W 
SR(W) sensory representation of W 
PS(X) preparation state for X: action a or expressing emotion by body state b 
ES(X) execution state for X: action a or expressing emotion by body state b 
OS(B, s, a, e) ownership state for B of action a with effect e and stimulus s 
OS(B, e, b) ownership state for B of emotion indicated by body state b and effect e  
EC(B, s, a, e) communication to B of ownership for B of action a with effect e and stimulus s 
EC(B, e, b) communication to B of ownership for B of emotion indicated by b and effect e 
EC(B, s, a, 
prediction
      loop 
action execution loop 
as-if body loop 
body loop 
PS(a) ES(a) 




WS(B, a) SS(B, a) 
ES(b) SR(b)  SS(b)  PS(b) WS(b) 
WS(B, b)  SS(B, SR(B, b)
WS(e) SR(e) 
OS(B, e, b) 
SS(e) 
EC(B, e, b) 
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Prediction of effects of prepared actions is modelled using the connection from the 
preparation PS(a) of the action a to the sensory representation SR(e) of the effect e. 
Suppression of the sensory representation of a predicted effect (according to, e.g., [3], 
[4], [28]) is modelled by the (inhibiting) connection from the ownership state OS(B, s, 
a, e) to sensory representation SR(e). The control exerted by the ownership state for 
action a is modelled by the connection from OS(B, s, a, e) to ES(a). Communicating 
ownership for an action (a way of expressing recognition of the other person’s states, 
as a verbal part of showing empathic understanding) is modelled by the connection 
from the ownership state OS(B, s, a, e) to the communication effector state EC(B, s, a, e). 
Similarly, communicating of ownership for an emotion for effect e indicated by b is 
modelled by the connection from the ownership state OS(B, e, b) to the communication 
effector state EC(B, e, b). Connections between state properties (the arrows in Fig. 1) 
have weights, as indicated in Table 2.  
Table 2. Overview of the connections and their weights 
from states to state weights LP 
SS(W) SR(W) ω1W LP1 
PS(a), OS(B, s, a, e), SS(e) SR(e) ω21e, ω22e, ω23e 
LP2 
PS(b), OS(B, e, b), SS(b) SR(b) ω21b, ω22b, ω23b 
SR(s), SR(b), SR(B, a) PS(a) ω31a, ω32a, ω33a 
LP3 
SR(e), SR(b), SR(B, b) PS(b) ω31b, ω32b, ω33b 
SR(B, a), SR(s), PS(a), SR(e) OS(B, s, a, e) ω41a, ω42a, ω43a, ω44a 
LP4 
SR(B, b), SR(e), PS(b), SR(b) OS(B, e, b) ω41b, ω42b, ω43b, ω44b 
OS(B, s, a, e), PS(a) ES(a) ω51a, ω52a 
LP5 
OS(B, e, b), PS(b) ES(b) ω51b, ω52b 
ES(a) WS(e) ω6e 
LP6 
ES(b) WS(b) ω6b 
WS(W) SS(W) ω7W LP7 
OS(B, s, a, e) EC(B, s, a, e) ω8a 
LP8 
OS(B, e, b) EC(B, e, b) ω8b 
 
In this table the column LP refers to the (temporally) Local Properties LP1 to LP9 
presented below. A weight usually has a value between -1 and 1 and may depend on the 
specific instance for agent B, stimulus s, action a and/or effect state b involved. Note that 
in general weights are assumed non-negative, except for inhibiting connections, such as 
ω22e which models suppression of the sensory representation of effect e, and  ω22b which 
models suppression of the sensory representation of body state b. 
Below, the dynamics following the connections between  the states in Fig. 1 are 
described in more detail. This is done for each state by a dynamic property specifying 
how the activation value for this state is updated based on the activation values of the 
states connected to it (the incoming arrows in Fig. 1). Note that in these property 
specifications s, a, e, b, and B are parameters for stimuli, actions, effects, body states, 
and agents, respectively; multiple instances for each of them can be used in a given 
agent model. The agent model has been computationally formalised using the hybrid 
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modeling language LEADSTO; cf. [5]. Within LEADSTO a dynamic property or 
temporal causal relation a →  b denotes that when a state property a (or conjunction 
thereof) occurs, then after a certain time delay, state property b will occur. Below, 
this delay will be taken as a uniform time step Δt. Each time first a semiformal 
description is given, and next a formal specification in the hybrid LEADSTO 
format. Parameter γ  indicates the speed by which an activation level is updated 
based on received input from  other states. During processing, each state property 
has an activation level represented by a real number between 0 and 1; variables V 
(possibly with subscripts) run over these values. In dynamic property specifications, 
this is added as a last argument to the state property expressions (an alternative 
notation activation(p, V) with p a state property has not been used for the sake of 
notational simplicity).  
Below, f is a function for which different choices can be made, for example, the 
identity function f(W) = W or a combination function based on a continuous logistic 
threshold function of the form 
 
    th(σ, τ, X) =  (         -    ) (1  )   or   th(σ, τ, X) = 1        
 
with σ a steepness and τ  a threshold value, when  X ≥ 0, and 0 when X < 0. Note that 
for higher values of στ (e.g., σ  > 20/τ) the right hand side threshold function can be 
used as an approximation. In the example simulations, in LP1, LP6, and LP7, f is 
taken the identity function f(W) = W, and for the other states f is a combination 
function based on the logistic threshold function:  f(X1, X2) = th(σ, τ, X1+X2), and 
similarly for other numbers of arguments; other types of combination functions might 
be used as well. For example values for τ  and σ, see Table 3 in Section 4. 
The first property LP1 describes how sensory representations are generated for any 
state W, indicating a stimulus s, an action a of an agent B, or a feeling b of an agent B. 
 
LP1  Sensory representation of w based on a sensor state for w 
If the sensor state for W has level V1  
  and the sensory representation of W has level  V2 
then after duration Δt  the sensory representation of W will have level  V2  + γ [ f(ω1WV1) - V2 ]  Δt. 
 SS(W, V1) & SR(W, V2)  →  SR(W, V2 + γ [ f(ω1WV1) – V2 ] Δt 
 
The sensory representation of an effect state e is not only affected by a corresponding 
sensor state for e (affected by the world state), but also by two action-related states:  
 
• via the predictive loop by a preparation state, as a way of internal simulation to 
predict the effect e of a prepared action a  
• by an inhibiting connection from the self-ownership state, to suppress the sensory 
representation of the effect e of the action a, once it is going to be initiated; e.g., 
[3], [4]  
 
This is expressed in dynamic property LP2. Note that for this suppressing effect the 
connection weight ω22e from ownership state for action a to sensory representation for 
effect e is taken negative, for example ω22e = -0.2. Dynamic property LP2b specifies a 
similar temporal relationship for update of the sensory representation of a body state, 
and thus models internal simulation by an as-if body loop. 
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LP2e  Sensory representation for an effect state e 
If the preparation state for action a has level V1 
  and the ownership of action a for B and s has level V2 
  and the sensor state for state e has level V3  and the sensory representation state of e has level V4 
then after Δt the sensory representation of e will have level V4 + γ [ f(ω21eV1, ω22eV2, ω23eV3) – V4 ] Δt. 
PS(a, V1) & OS(B, s, a, e, V2) & SS(b, V3) & SR(b, V4) →   SR(b, V4 + γ [f(ω21eV1, ω22eV2, ω23eV3) – V4] Δt) 
 
LP2b  Sensory representation for a body state b 
If the preparation state for body state b has level V1 
  and the ownership of body state b for B and b, and e has level V2 
  and the sensor state for state b has level V3  and the sensory representation of state b has level V4 
then after Δt the sensory representation of b will have level V4 + γ [ f(ω21bV1, ω22bV2, ω23bV3) – V4 ] Δt. 
 
PS(a, V1) & OS(B, e, b, V2) & SS(b, V3) & SR(b, V4) →  SR(b, V4 + γ [ f(ω21bV1, ω22obV2, ω23bV3) – V4]Δt) 
 
Preparation for action a is affected by  
• the sensory representation of stimulus s  
• the body state b associated to the predicted effect e of the action,  
• observation of the action (tendency) in another agent 
The first bullet is an external trigger for the action. The second bullet models the 
impact of the result b of the emotion-related valuing of the action effect e. The third 
bullet models the mirroring effect for the action as observed as a tendency in another 
agent. Similarly for the preparation for a body state b; here the sensory representation 
of the effect e serves as a trigger, and the emotion state of another agent is mirrored. 
 
LP3a  Preparing for an action a 
If sensory representation of s has level V1  and sensory representation of body state b has level V2 
  and sensory representation of B for a has level V3  and the preparation for action a has level V4  
then after Δt  preparation for action a will have level V4 + γ [ f(ω31aV1, ω32aV2, ω33BaV3) – V4 ] Δt. 
SR(s,V1)  &  SR(b,V2)  &  SR(B, a)  &  PS(a, V4) →   PS(a, V4 + γ [ f(ω31aV1, ω32aV2, ω33BaV3) – V4 ] Δt) 
 
LP3b  Preparing for a body state b 
If sensory representation of e has level V1  and sensory representation of b has level V2 
  and sensory representation of B for b has level V3  and the preparation for action a has level V4  
then after Δt  preparation for action a will have level V4 + γ [ f(ω31bV1, ω32bV2, ω33BbV3) – V4 ] Δt. 
SR(e,V1)  &  SR(b,V2)  &  SR(B, b)  &  PS(b, V4) →   PS(b, V4 + γ [ f(ω31bV1, ω32bV2, ω33BbV3) – V4 ] Δt) 
 
Ownership states for an action a or body state b are generated by LP4a and LP4b. 
They keep track of the agent’s context with respect to the action or body state. This 
context concerns both the agent self and the other agents and their extent of 
ownership of the action or body change; in this sense it is a basis for attribution to an 
agent, and includes self-other distinction. Moreover, a self-ownership is used to 
control execution of prepared actions or body states, like super mirror neurons are 
assumed to do. For example, in case the agent B is self, the ownership state for action 
a strengthens the initiative to perform a as a self-generated action: executing a 
prepared action depends on whether a certain activation level of the ownership state 
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for the agent self is available for this action. This is how control over the execution of 
the action (go/no-go decision) is exerted, and can, for example, be used to veto the 
action in a stage of preparation. 
 
LP4a  Generating an ownership  state for B and a 
If  the sensory representation of (tendency for) action a in agent B has level V1 
  and the sensory representation of s has level V2  and  the preparation for action a has level V3 
  and the sensory representation of e has level V4  and ownership of a for B, s and e has level V5  
then after Δt ownership of a for B, s and e will have  
level V5+ γ  [ f(ω41aV1, ω42aV2, ω43aV3, ω44aV4) – V5] Δt. 
SR(B, a,V1)  &  SR(s,V2) &  PS(a, V3) & SR(e,V4) &  OS(B, s, a, e, V5) 
→   OS(B, s, a, e, V5 + γ [ f(ω41aV1, ω42aV2, ω43aV3, ω44aV4) – V5 ]  Δt) 
 
LP4b  Generating an ownership  state for B and b 
If  the sensory representation of B with body state b has level V1 
  and the sensory representation of e has level V2  and  the preparation for body state b has level V3 
  and the sensory representation of b has level V4  and ownership of b for B and e has level V5 
then after Δt ownership of b for B and e will have  
level V5+ γ  [ f(ω41bV1, ω42bV2, ω43bV3, ω44bV4) – V5] Δt. 
SR(B, b,V1)  &  SR(e,V2) &  PS(b, V3) &  SR(b,V4) & OS(B, e, b, V5) 
→   OS(B, e, b, V5 + γ [ f(ω41bV1, ω42bV2, ω43bV3, ω44bV4) – V5 ]  Δt) 
 
Note that in case that B is the agent self, the first condition in LP4a and LP4b indicates 
how far the agent has a certain willingness to come to an action or expression. For 
example, when no other agent is present the willingness to explicitly express emotions 
may be less, or when the agent is in a passive mood, willingness to come to an action 
a may be low. The use of ownership states in control of execution is modelled by 
LP5: 
 
LP5a  Action a execution 
If ownership of a for B and s and e has level V1  and preparation for action a has level V2   
  and  the action execution state for a has level V3 
then after Δt the action execution state for a will have level V3 + γ  [ f(ω51aV1, ω52aV2) – V3 ] Δt. 
OS(B, s, a, e, V1)  &  PS(a, V2)  &  ES(a, V3)  →   ES(a, V3 + γ [ f(ω51aV1, ω52aV2) – V3 ]  Δt) 
 
LP5b  Body change b execution 
If ownership of b for B and e has level V1  and preparation for body state b has level V2 
  and  the execution state for b has level V3 
then after Δt the execution state for b will have level V3 + γ  [ f(ω51bV1, ω52bV2) – V3 ] Δt. 
OS(B, e, b, V1)  &  PS(b, V2)  &  ES(b, V3)   →   ES(b, V3 + γ [ f(ω51bV1, ω52bV2) – V3 ]  Δt) 
 
Note that these executions also function as the nonverbal part of the empathic 
response; e.g., showing a face expression with the same emotion as the other person.  
Property LP6 describes in a straightforward manner how execution of action a or 
body change b affects the world state for effect e or body state b.  
 
LP6e  From action execution to effect state 
If the execution state for action a has level V1  and world state e has level V2  
then after Δt  world state e will have level V2 + γ  [ f(ω6eV1) – V2 ] Δt. 
ES(a, V1)  &  WS(e, V2) →   WS(e, V2 + γ [ f(ω6eV1) – V2 ] Δt) 
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LP6b  From body change execution to body state 
If the execution state for body state b has level V1   and body state b has level V2  
then after Δt  body state b will have level V2 + γ  [ f(ω6bV1) – V2 ] Δt. 
ES(a, V1)  &  WS(b, V2) →   WS(b, V2 + γ [ f(ω6bV1) – V2 ] Δt) 
 
The following property models how sensor states are updated. It applies to an action a 
of agent B, a feeling b of agent B, a stimulus s, effect e, or emotion indicated by body 
state b (covered by variable W). 
LP7  Generating a sensor state for a world or body state W 
If world state W has level V1   and  the sensor state for W has level V2 
then after Δt  the sensor state for W will have level V2 + γ [ f(ω7WV1) – V2] Δt. 
WS(W, V1) & SS(W, V2) →   SS(W, V2 + γ [ f(ω7WV1) – V2 ] Δt) 
 
Communication of ownership of the other agent to the other agent represents 
acknowledgement of an agent that it has noticed the state of the other agent: a verbal 
part of the empathic response. These communications depend on the ownership states 
as specified in LP8. 
 
LP8a  Communication of the other agent B’s intention a and e for s 
If the ownership state of a and e for B and s has level V1, 
  and communication of a and e for B and s has level V2 
then after Δt communication of a and e for B and s will have level V2 + γ  [ f(ω8aV1) – V2 ] Δt. 
OS(B, s, a, e, V1)  &  EO(B, s, a, V2) →   EO(B, s, a, e, V2 + γ [ f(ω8aV1) – V2 ] Δt) 
 
LP8b  Communication of the other agent B’s emotion b for e 
If the ownership state of b for B and e has level V1, 
  and communication of b for B and e has level V2 
then after Δt communication of b for B and e will have level V2 + γ  [ f(ω8bV1) – V2 ] Δt. 
OS(B, e, b, V1)  &  EO(B, e, b, V2) →   EO(B, e, b, V2 + γ [ f(ω8bV1) – V2 ] Δt) 
4   Simulation Results 
In this section simulation results are discussed for scenarios that have been explored. 
Note that in this section for the sake of simplicity two agents A and B are considered 
and for each of s, a, e, b, just one instance is used, which is the same for both agents. 
In the first two scenarios mutual empathic understanding and convergence to a joint 
decision are achieved (for two different situations), and in the third scenario mutual 
empathic understanding is achieved but no convergence to a joint decision. In the 
scenarios discussed all connection strengths were taken 1, except the inhibiting 
connections, which were taken -0.2, and the connection to the action effect in the 
world which was taken 0 as the focus here is on the process of decision making prior 
to the actual execution of the decision. The speed factor γ  was set to 0.5 and ∆t = 0.2. 
In the scenario shown in Fig. 2 both agents get stimulus s as input with level 1. Here 
time is on the horizontal axis and activation levels as indicated are on the vertical 
axis. The upper graph shows agent A and the lower graph agent B. The threshold and 
steepness values used (for both agents) are shown in Table 3. 
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Fig. 2. Reaching a joint decision and mutual understanding for different self-contexts 
Table 3. Threshold and steepness values used 
LP LP2e LP2b LP3a LP3b LP4a LP4b LP5a LP5b LP8a LP8b 
threshold τ 0.2 0.7 1 0.7 3.2 3.2 1.6 1 0.6 0.6 
steepness σ 4 4 4 4 8 8 20 20 20 20 
 
The only difference between the two agents is that agent A has level 1 for the self-
context factor which indicates willingness to come to action and for agent B this is 
0.5. In Fig. 2 the following is shown: 
• From time point 3 on, triggered by the stimulus s, both agents develop a preparation for 
action option a, which is immediately followed by activation of predicted effect e.  
• Around time point 6 both agents start to develop an emotional response preparation for 
b triggered by the predicted effect e.  
• As a consequence (by the as-if body loop), for both the feeling of this emotion starts 
from time point 9 on.  
• Around time point 10 agent A starts to activate the self ownership state for action 
option a, whereas for agent B this only happens later, after time point 16, due to its 
lower self-context value.  
• Due to this, agent A expresses (the tendency for) action option a from time point 20 on 
(marked line). 
• Around time 21 agent A starts to develop a self-ownership state for emotion b  
• From time point 22 on agent A expresses the emotion felt (marked line).  
 
Note that at this point in time agent B does not yet show such reactions, due to the 
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expression (action a tendency and body state b) from agent A, agent B is affected in 
its preparation levels for both the action a option and the bodily response b.  
• Around time 16 agent B has started to develop a self-ownership state for the action a. 
• From time point 21 agent B also starts to develop a self-ownership state for feeling b 
and expresses the feeling of b (marked line).  
• From time 22 on agent B develops an ownership state for agent A of action a, and from 
time 24 on agent B develops an ownership state for agent A feeling b. 
• The expression of a tendency for action option a is developed by agent B from time 
point 26 on (marked line).  
This actually creates a joint decision for action option a, accompanied by a shared 
good feeling b for it. Moreover, this also provides the nonverbal part of B’s empathic 
response on agent A’s action tendency and feeling.  
• After time 27 agent B starts to develop an ownership state for agent A feeling b. 
• Agent B shows a verbal empathic response to A for both the action and the feeling 
starting at time points 28 and 31, respectively (marked lines).  
The verbal empathic response from agent A to B comes later, which reflects the fact 
that some time was needed to get agent B in the proper state (due to mirroring) to 
show support for action option a and feeling b:  
• Agent A develops ownership states for agent B of action a and B feeling b starting at 
time 28 and 29, respectively. 
• At time points 33 and 34 (marked lines, upper graph), agent A shows a verbal empathic 
response to B for both the action and the feeling, respectively. 
This shows how the process to reach a joint decision can b based on different 
processes within each of the agents, and their mutual impact on each other. 
A second scenario addressed a case in which agent B and A both have self-context 
level 1, and A has stimulus level 1, and agent B 0.5. Also in this case after some time 
a joint decision comes out, but now agent B depends on agent A for its activation of 
preparation for action option a and the associated emotional response and feeling. 
Therefore during the period from time point 5 to time point 25 the activation levels of 
action preparation, effect prediction, emotional response and feeling stay low. After 
time point 25 they move up due to agent A’s expression starting at time 20 and 21. 
A third scenario addressed a case in which agent A has self-context level 1, but for 
agent B this level is 0. The stimulus s for both has level 1. In this case no joint 
decision comes out, as agent B does not follow A in the action option a, but still 
empathic responses are shown. As in the scenario in Fig. 2 agent B develops 
expressed states for the action a and feeling b, from time point 20 on. Also agent B 
shows the same pattern as in Fig. 2, up to time point 20. However, then a main 
difference is that in this scenario the self ownership state of B for action a does not 
develop; it gets a level not much more than 0.1. As a consequence no tendency for 
action a is developed.  Note that due to the emotion contagion still the feeling level of 
agent B becomes higher and as a result this feeling is expressed (from time point 22 
on), thus contributing a nonverbal empathic response. Moreover, also verbal empathic 
responses of agent B are developed (after time points 27 and 30, respectively). 
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5   Discussion 
In this paper a social agent model was presented based on mechanisms from Social 
Neuroscience. The model addresses the emergence of joint decisions, accompanied by 
shared emotions and mutually acknowledged empathic understanding. To this end it 
covers both cognitive and affective processes and their interaction in decision making, 
and social contagion. Core mechanisms adopted are mirror neurons (e.g., [23, 32, 35, 
39]), internal simulation (e.g., [8, 10, 16, 17, 20]), and emotion-related valuing of 
predicted effects of action options (e.g., [1, 8, 9, 11, 29, 31]). It was shown how such 
social agent models can be used to perform simulation and analysis of the emergence 
of joint decisions grounded in shared emotion-related valuing, and together with 
mutual empathic understanding of agents.  
The social agent model uses elements from the model presented in [37] for the 
empathic understanding, but in contrast to [37] where the empathic understanding was 
limited to emotions, in the current model it is applied to both (tendencies for) actions 
and emotions. Furthermore, the current model uses  the idea of ownership states as in 
the model presented in [38]. However, in [38] ownership states are differentiated into 
prior and retrospective ownership states, which was not done in the current model. 
Moreover, in the current model the ownership states were used both for actions and 
for expressing emotions, whereas in [38] they were only focused on actions, and 
emotions were not addressed. Another difference to both [37] and [38] is the use in 
the current model of social contagion to affect both action tendencies and associated 
feelings in order to come to joint decisions accompanied by shared associated 
emotions. This purpose was also addressed at an abstract level in [21] and [22], but 
the models in these references do not address the underlying internal neurological 
mechanisms within the agents, and the mutually acknowledged empathic 
understanding as addressed in the model presented in the current paper. 
Beliefs and explicit information exchange by means of verbal communication was 
left out of consideration in the presented model. In an extension this can be added and 
integrated, for example, in manner similar to what is described in [21] or [22].  
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